fp decision making bill clinton

Record: 1
Title: Stability and change in President Clinton's foreign policy beliefs, 1993-96.
Subject(s): CLINTON, Bill -- Views on international relations; UNITED States -- Foreign relations -- 1993-; PRESIDENTS -- United States
Source: Presidential Studies Quarterly, Summer98, Vol. 28 Issue 3, p638, 28p, 1 diagram
Author(s): JEWETT, AUBREY W.; TURETZKY, MARC D.
Abstract: Focuses on the views of United States President Bill Clinton of foreign policy and the US role in international affairs. Debate over Clinton's worldview; Psychological approaches to foreign policy analysis; Clinton's worldview on the expansion of commerce in a changing world; Changes in Clinton's worldview in 1994 until 1995; Focus on the pursuit of global security and commerce; Stability and change in Clinton's belief system; Conclusion.
AN: 1270945
ISSN: 0360-4918
Database: Academic Search Elite




STABILITY AND CHANGE IN PRESIDENT CLINTON'S FOREIGN POLICY BELIEFS, 1993-96

Debate over President Clinton's Worldview

The election of Bill Clinton as president in November 1992 brought to Washington, DC, a "self-admitted [domestic] 'policy wonk'" who "was clearly less comfortable with foreign and defense matters than his predecessor.(n1) Indeed, throughout the 1992 presidential campaign, candidate Clinton made it clear that "if a battle was to be fought, resources of intervention deployed, it would be in a war against domestic problems, not foreign enemies."(n2) In other words, the public had a good idea that if Clinton were elected, he would "focus like a laser beam" on the domestic economy in order to be the domestic policy president that George Bush had not been. However, because he spent the majority of his time discussing domestic problems, his views on foreign policy and America's place in the post-cold war world largely remained a mystery.(n3)

Some argue that the ad hoc, inconsistent nature of American foreign policy during 1993 and 1994 further contributed to the growing feeling that President Clinton had still not developed a coherent worldview. During his first term, for example, he earned the nickname "William the Waffler" for his administration's supposed inconsistency in linking rhetoric with policy on human rights violations in China, refugee problems in Cuba and Haiti, and in haphazardly getting the United States involved in the long-running, tragic conflict in Bosnia.(n4) Thus, trying to discern Clinton's image of the world has been the cause of much debate and academic focus, particularly since, as the first "baby boomer" president, Clinton has very little "in common with the life experiences and shared worldview of the generation of Cold War leaders" who preceded him.(n5)

Much analysis of Clinton's foreign policy at midterm characterizes the president's worldview and his administration's policy as inconsistent/incoherent, complex/complicated, or nonexistent. Fred Greenstein describes Clinton's approach to foreign policy as "highly personalistic and sometimes indecisive" and his worldview as "inconsistent."(n6) Wolfowitz generally concurs with Greenstein, calling it "confused and inconsistent."(n7) Friedman also agrees, calling the president's "foreign policy blueprint nonexistent" and incoherent.(n8) Brent Scowcroft characterizes the Clinton image of the world as a "peripatetic foreign policy outlook at prey to the whims of the latest balance of forces."(n9)

Gelb and others disagree, arguing instead that Clinton does have a coherent worldview: these analyses argue that President Clinton's worldview is "complex and coherent" rather than inconsistent and confused.(n10) Schneider, for example, argues that President Clinton has developed a cohesive, complex sense of U.S. policy as "more multilateral" and oriented toward collective efforts "to deal with threats to the [international] peace.(n11) J. Bryan Hehir also agrees that the Clinton image of the world is complex and suggests that it is one well tailored for the realities of a world that has changed to such a degree that "the very depth and change at work in the world has made the formulation of a grand strategy impossible."(n12)

Another prominent midterm view centers on the idea that Clinton simply does not have a foreign policy worldview because he focuses almost exclusively on domestic political, economic, and social concerns. Robert Pastor explains that Bill Clinton justifies his administration's "internationalism by reference to domestic political concerns like drugs, crime, or jobs, and that he employs a domestic political calculus to judge when and how to respond to foreign crises."(n13) Berman and Goldman argue that "Clinton has defined the U.S. national purpose as one of domestic renewal."(n14) Lieber reports that upon taking office as president, Clinton was initially very reluctant to devote regular attention to foreign policy, but that if his policy had to be articulated, it would center on the nexus between domestic and international concerns, especially the link between the global and the domestic economy.(n15)

More recent research and debate show that there is still a decided lack of consensus on whether President Clinton has developed a coherent worldview. Lieber, for example, argues that the administration's first-term foreign policy was characterized by a "highly personalistic and sometimes indecisive decision-making style."(n16) He notes however, that the confusion and indecision are understandable given the withering of the cold war, "the absence of an external threat [and] the concomitant reduced priority for foreign affairs."(n17) Thomas Omestad argues that Clinton's first two years were marred by inconsistent, uncertain, and puzzling policies toward Bosnia's Serbs, China's communists, and Haiti's dictators, among others.(n18) According to Omestad, however, the final two years of Clinton's first term show that he did develop a consistent and effective foreign policy: "realism was prevailing over impractical idealism, clarity over confusion. Illusions were being shed and greater policy coherence attained."(n19)

On the other hand, Charles William Maynes believes that Clinton started with a coherent foreign policy but has ended up with an inconsistent, "reactive" policy and worldview.(n20) According to Maynes, the administration came to office with a vision of centering America's post-cold war foreign policy on the idea of democratic and free market "enlargement." However, the administration abandoned this policy and began to follow a reactive policy pattern, in which "events and not doctrine have driven foreign policy responses.(n21) Along this same line, one-time Republican presidential hopeful Arlen Specter critically suggests that the United States needs "a president who projects a foreign policy that is more than a surprised reaction to world events."(n22)

In contrast to Maynes, and in support of Omestad, others argue that Clinton started off inconsistently but has developed a cohesive worldview and foreign policy. For instance, Douglas Brinkley says the president took office with a foreign policy centering on "crisis management rather than strategic doctrine," but by midterm decided on a policy centering on "enlargement."(n23) According to Brinkley, since 1994, President Clinton has followed a consistent and effective foreign policy path: foster and consolidate "new democracies and market economics where possible" and "counter the aggression and support the liberalization of states hostile to democracy."(n24) Finally, Snow and Brown suggest that except for foreign economic policy, foreign policy did not maintain Clinton's interest during his first term, and thus "the president has not shown consistent leadership, and this has been reflected in policy inconstancy."(n25)

One thing is clear about the president's foreign policy worldview: it profoundly puzzles reporters, pundits, and academics alike. Thus far, there has been little theory or empirical evidence to use as a guide in making sense of Clinton's many seeming inconsistencies. In our study, we use a political psychology perspective to examine and more systematically explicate the worldview of President Clinton during his first term as president. First, the role of individual beliefs in foreign policy are examined. We follow the lead of the majority of scholars who have studied the foreign policy perceptions and beliefs of political leaders and focus our attention on one key political actor: President William Jefferson Clinton. Second, the level of stability and change in beliefs is analyzed over time. As Rosati explains, "most studies on perceptions and beliefs tend to be static and rarely integrate other factors that may affect the evolution of an image."(n26) We establish Clinton's worldview for 1993 and discuss how and why it came to be. Then we examine his worldview during 1994, 1995, and 1996 to look for differences and similarities. Finally, we assess the effects of system structure, personality, external events, and domestic forces to explain stability and change in the president's image of the international system over his first term in office.

In brief, three primary research questions guide this study. First, what is President Clinton's image of the international system throughout his first four years in office? Second, does this image remain stable, or does it change over time? Third, if worldview does evolve through the term, what factors help explain this change?

Psychological Approaches to Foreign Policy Analysis

Systematic research on attitudes and attitudinal change commenced in the 1930s but became more prominent in the 1960s. For the most part, this research had been the domain of social psychology. However, by the mid-1960s, some fairly prominent international relations scholars began to apply what has been discovered about attitudes in their own work. Kelman,(n27) Brodin,(n28) and Jervis(n29) were all early advocates of attitudinal data for their work on beliefs and images. A considerable amount of work on belief systems has been devoted to the description of images.(n30) A large amount of research has also been devoted to examining the content of beliefs, including elite image studies by Holsti(n31) and Starr,(n32) research on operational codes by George(n33) and Holsti,(n34) cognitive mapping by Axelrod,(n35) and work on the effects of personality by Etheredge(n36) and Tetlock.(n37)

One of the most significant elite image studies to date is Ole Holsti's research on the relationship between Secretary of State John Foster Dulles's beliefs and his mode of processing and interpreting foreign information.(n38) According to Holsti, Dulles maintained a rigidly negative view of the USSR throughout his tenure as secretary of state by selectively processing new information and by "explaining" away nonhostile Soviet actions as the "exigencies of weakness." Starr's general focus is the connection between individual belief systems and discrete behavior. His research centers on Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's belief system.(n39) In it, Starr notes the strong congruence between what Kissinger wrote as an academic and his own behavior as a policy maker and, in the process, demonstrates the continuing relevance of research on foreign policy beliefs.

Alexander George explains that operational codes help to impose order and stability on an inherently complex and unstable global system by providing norms, standards, and guidelines that affect a policy maker's view of the world and choice of policies in dealing with other countries.(n40) According to Holsti, operational codes are organized in such a way that central beliefs wield more influence on peripheral beliefs than the converse.(n41) One salient organizational feature of the operational code concept is whether the policy maker believes that the world is essentially conflictual or harmonious. Holsti also states that those who view the world in essentially conflictual terms are likely to differ on a variety of belief dimensions from those who see the world as potentially cooperative(n42) Tetlock adds that policy makers possess the ability or capacity to view international events (such as aggressive and conciliatory Soviet actions) in ways that either support or contradict their initial positions.(n43) Using a three-part typology of presidential personality derived from Alexander George's work,(n44) Snow and Brown assess President Clinton on three key personality traits: cognitive style, sense of personal efficacy, and orientation toward political core flict.(n45) In terms of cognitive style, Bill Clinton is a "policy wonk" who is quite bright and immerses himself in details of the policy under study. President Clinton believes strongly in his own political efficacy and relies heavily on coalition building and persuasion to pursue his objectives. Finally, as a "genuine people pleaser," Clinton typically seeks to minimize political conflict. Snow and Brown believe that it is primarily the trait of conflict avoidance that presents Clinton with the biggest challenge: it may aid him as a peacemaker in resolving bloody regional conflicts, but it may also lead to "dangerous policy drift in a chaotic world requiring decisive leadership."(n46)

Cognitive mapping, according to Axelrod, is a research technique that allows analysts to come to know the policy domains of decision makers.(n47) Tetlock and McGuire explain that "cognitive maps consist of two key elements: concept variables, which are represented as points, and casual beliefs linking the concepts, represented as arrows between points."(n48) These concept variables can be defined simply as "something that can take on different values" such as balance of trade, U.S. security policy, or defense spending.(n49) In his 1976 classic Structure of Decisions, Robert Axelrod constructs a number of cognitive maps that are based on interviews with policy makers as well as content analyses of archival documents. Axelrod finds that the systematic analysis of cognitive maps has clearly improved our overall understanding of the cognitive roots of foreign policy, despite the fact that cognitive maps tend to be large, detailed, and overly elaborate devices. Nevertheless, a fairly cogent, cognitive portrait of policy makers does emerge: a policy maker who generally has "more beliefs than he can handle, employs a simplified image of the policy environment that is structurally easy to operate with, and who then acts rationally within the context of his simplified image."(n50)

The basic assumptions made by researchers studying the effects of personality are, first, that "a leader's words and the scores based on them are a reasonable guide to the speaker's personality" and, second, that personality does have important, predictable effects on political behavior.(n51) Scholars studying the effects of personality acknowledge that personality alone does not "cause" behavior.(n52) Instead, they suggest that "political behavior will be strongly shaped and constrained by situational factors such as budget deficits and economic-organization difficulties," but there are occasions when personalities of single actors can affect events--for instance, when the leader occupies a strategic location in his or her country or when the present situation demands active effort rather than routine role performance.(n53)

As the first truly post-cold war president, Bill Clinton seems to fit these two criteria. Specifically, Snow and Brown assert that President Clinton's personality, decisio-nmaking style, and foreign policy team ensure that "Clinton himself will remain at the center of his administration's foreign policy development.(n54) Furthermore, Snow and Brown state that foreign policy making today takes place in an environment "in which the familiar signposts of the Cold War" are now entirely gone, and even if Clinton had come into office wanting to disengage from foreign policy (and presumably rely primarily on bureaucratic standard operating procedures and routine role performance), a variety of new challenges would have made it impossible for the president to do so.(n55)

Determining Worldview

To determine a policy-maker's beliefs about the international system, or worldview, images of the current and of the preferred future international system must be examined.(n56) This process is outlined in Figure 1. The current image is identified by examining perceptions of international actors (their importance, capabilities, intentions, and normative evaluation) and, most significantly, the primary issues in which the actors are involved. The perceived importance and capabilities of the actors provide the underlying framework for the system; the perceived intentions and normative evaluations of the actors illustrate the conflictual or cooperative nature of the interactions. Looking at issues in conjunction with actors provides a measure of the complexity of the worldview: single-issue dominance or a bipolar view that sees one nation dominating all issues represents simple thinking; issue pluralism or the perception that actor importance differs depending on the issue indicates a more complex worldview. The preferred future image is determined by looking at the type of prospective system that the policy maker aspires to create and by seeing if global change is viewed as desirable. Put another way, is the leader generally content with the existing system, or does he or she hope to see it transformed? If change is viewed as positive, in what direction does he or she hope to channel it?(n57)

At the bottom of Figure 1, the hypothesized relationship between worldview and behavior is diagrammed in a feedback model. Here, the decision maker is thought to have an image of the international system: a worldview. The actor's perception of the global system affects the beliefs that he or she holds; subsequently (or perhaps concurrently), the beliefs concerning international relations modify foreign policy behavior. In turn, the actual behavior has an effect on the system itself. The cycle repeats itself as the actor alters his or her perceptions to accommodate the new situation.

Content Analysis

President Clinton's image of the international system is inferred by content analyzing the public statements he made during his first term in office (1993-96), as recorded in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. According to Weber, "content analysis is a research methodology that utilizes a set of procedures to make valid inferences from text."(n58) Frequently, these inferences are about the intentions, characteristics, or beliefs of the source of the communication.(n59) Debate over the usefulness of public statements in determining beliefs centers on whether they are representational, displaying actual beliefs, or are instrumental and manufactured to persuade a specific audience.(n60) Generally, it seems clear that there is some overlap between the two but that judicious inferences concerning beliefs can still be made.(n61) This conclusion is particularly helpful since these public statements are frequently all a researcher has access to.(n62) Hermann adds that "content analysis has proven useful in measuring the personality characteristics of political leaders like heads of government who are virtually inaccessible for personality testing or clinical interviewing."(n63)

In this study, we use public statements primarily for logistical reasons: interviews are impractical, and transcripts of many private meetings from 1993-96 are still not yet available. However, the use of public statements can be justified on several theoretical grounds.(n64) Public statements act as a constraint on political leaders who generally must be worried about credibility, influence the speaker through reducing cognitive dissonance where beliefs are adjusted to fit incongruent acts, and shape the policy maker's beliefs through the process of self-perception in which beliefs are derived from observing behavior.(n65)

We employ quantitative content analysis on all public foreign policy statements that President Clinton made during his first term in office to identify the most important international issues and actors he perceived; these issues and actors are identified through the annual subject index of the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. We collapse the raw data into twelve general issue categories and eight general actor categories based on the logical groupings that President Clinton himself seemed to envision, and then we examine the frequency distribution of the general categories.

A qualitative content analysis of the most important public statements concerning foreign policy is used to fully determine the president's worldview. This is the reverse of Rosati's method of quantitatively analyzing a sample of important presidential statements and then qualitatively analyzing a larger number.(n66) The method used here arguably provides a more accurate view of the most important issues and actors by avoiding selection bias. Furthermore, as Alexander George notes, qualitative content analysis on a limited number of vital speeches provides more detailed information about the speaker's intentions and preferences than does a large-sample quantitative analysis.(n67) In this case, qualitative analysis also provides specific information concerning Clinton's beliefs about the important issues and actors, as well as his "preferred future."

Clinton's Images 1993: Expansion of Global Commerce

President Clinton's worldview during his first year in office can best be summed up as the expansion of commerce in a changing world or, more succinctly, "it's the global economy, stupid." Generally, when President Clinton first took office, he saw the post-cold war international environment as interdependent and rapidly changing. However, in 1993, Clinton also had a relatively simple view of the most important actors and issues in the international system. As Table 1 indicates, a number of actors seem to be important, although the global economic and security institutions category is clearly the largest. By the same token, many issues are addressed, but the economy category clearly dominates; it is the only issue found in conjunction with every actor.

Clinton's relatively simple view of actors and issues emerged after the fall of the Soviet Union altered the structure of the international system for the first time in more than four decades. During the cold war, American presidents typically had viewed the USSR as the most significant actor in a bipolar world and national security, operationalized as containment of communism, as the most important issue. Change and interdependence resulted from the increasing impact that global events began to have on the domestic politics of governments and the welfare of their citizens. Interdependence also flowed in reverse, as Clinton viewed the United States's well-being as crucial to the prosperity and security of the world. President Clinton also maintained an optimistic view of the global environment. In spite of the uncertainty and danger that rapid international political and economic change often bring, he saw the world as basically cooperative.

Furthermore, in 1993, Clinton viewed change as desirable and believed that America could and should actively lead the world to his preferred future. His desired international system was one in which all nations embrace the tenants of classical liberalism: democracy and, especially, market economics. Clinton's strategic vision has sometimes been labeled enlargement, a term devised in the summer of 1993 by Jeremy Rosner, a speech writer for National Security Adviser Anthony Lake.(n68)

Actors

Table 1 shows that the global economic and security institutions categor3 dominates beliefs about actors with more than 35 percent of the total statements. Latin America, Asia/Pacific, Middle East, Russia, and Eastern Europe follow behind in a closely packed cluster, receiving approximately 11.5 percent to 9.5 percent of Clinton'., verbal attention. Africa and Western Europe trail the main grouping by several percentage points.

The emergence of the global institutions category can be tied to some degree to the increasing importance of the United Nations due to the lessening of hostilities with communist and former communist nations. For decades, ideological polarity between the superpowers had kept the United Nations in a state of relative gridlock. Furthermore, American political conservatives and moderates during this period often viewed it as a body that held interests inimical to the United States. In 1993, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the cold war, and the trend of warming relations with China all combined to create an environment in which global beliefs were more homogeneous, and the United Nations could potentially be a more effective agent.(n69)

The centrality of the global institutions category in 1993 also represented Clinton's belief in the need to improve the general economy of the world using vehicles such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) to help the United States and individual nations as a result of interdependence. Clinton's cooperative approach to security concerns, working in concert with the United Nations on almost all regional conflicts, also explains the dominance of the global actor in his worldview. In sum, President Clinton viewed the United Nations as the most important actor, being more capable of effective action than in the past, having positive to benign intentions toward the United States, and acting as a forum for mostly cooperative relations now and in the future.

Latin America was an important part of Clinton's belief system primarily due to its close physical proximity to the United States; it was the second-ranked actor occupying 11.36 percent of the president's belief statements. Table 1 indicates that Latin America continued to have important implications for U.S. security and economic well-being. Economic issues with Latin America were dominated by work with Mexico on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Security issues revolved around the continuing Haitian conflict. Clinton saw Latin America as being fairly weak overall but with tremendous economic potential; with the exception of Cuba and Haiti, relationships in the region were seen as uniformly positive and cooperative.

Asia/Pacific, the third-ranked actor at 11.21 percent, achieved a new primacy and geostrategic importance in the president's thinking compared to previous presidents: "the time has come for America to join with Japan and the others in this region to create a new Pacific community."(n70) During the cold war, Japan was often linked to the West in the worldview of American foreign policy makers as a valued ally against Soviet expansion. For instance, during the 1970s, President Carter clearly linked Japan to Western Europe, which reflects a developmental and ideological linkage he perceived to exist among our closest and strongest allies.(n71) Significantly, Clinton did not group Japan with Western Europe in his foreign policy schema: "The new Pacific community will rest on a revived partnership between the United States and Japan."(n72) Table I shows that a variety of issues were associated with this area. For example, Japan, China, and the Koreas were dominant in this region for the economy. Human rights was most connected with China, arms control was most connected with China and especially North Korea, and security and defense were connected with Japan and South Korea.

The Middle East (at 10.42 percent), as Table 1 indicates, was the most conflictual region and comprised a number of actors: Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO); Iraq, the United Nations, and the United States; and Libya and the United States (specifically, the terrorist bombing of a Pan Am jet). The Middle East's ranking indicates that President Clinton still saw the region as strategically important to the United States, largely because of oil supplies and the long-standing commitment to Israel. The Middle East was one of the few regions where several specific actors were normatively viewed by Clinton as having overtly hostile intentions toward U.S. regional interests.

When Clinton came into office in 1993, Russia and the states of the former Soviet Union, while less powerful and threatening than during the cold war, were still perceived as important (9.99 percent), primarily because of the potential for resumed hostilities if their move toward democracy and capitalism faltered. Table I shows that Russia scored fairly high on the economy, due mostly to trade and aid from the United States and help from the International Monetary Fund (IMF); conflict, due to the tensions experienced after the "coup" staged by President Yeltsin on his own parliament; and normalization with the United States, which Clinton viewed as essential to better relations between the two countries. Clinton's positive evaluation of Russia seemed closely tied to the president's positive evaluation of Russian intentions under Yeltsin.

Eastern Europe also commanded the president's attention in 1993; significantly, Clinton viewed the former Soviet satellites as being nearly as important as Russia, occupying 9.78 percent of the actor category. In Clinton's view, a peaceful, democratic, economically vibrant Eastern Europe was essential to American security interests: as a hedge against ideological backsliding in the region, particularly in Russia, and because of the continued ethnic conflict that threatened to expand to surrounding areas. Table 1 nicely illustrates these concerns: Eastern Europe registered in Clinton's beliefs in regard to the conflict in Bosnia, trade with ex-communist countries, and arms control. Clinton's overall view of Eastern Europe befitted the complexity of the region: generally weak economically, but with potential and actual military capabilities, and having fairly positive intentions toward the United States and its "ethos" but also displaying a vexing mix of cooperative and conflictual interactions.

Africa ranked sixth with a 7.19 percent share, and was important primarily because of the civil war in Somalia but also because of the Angolan conflict and for assorted human rights issues (nonracial democratization in South Africa, for instance). Africa's low ranking is not surprising considering that past U.S. policy interest has been fueled primarily by cold war competition with the USSR. Western Europe remained important for economic issues, but its last-place ranking (4.67 percent) surely reflects a lessening of its strategic salience after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the removal of two million Warsaw Pact troops poised to storm through the Fulda Gap. Western Europe continued to be seen as having powerful capabilities (both military and economic) and friendly intentions, thus its low ranking in Clinton's belief system was more likely a function of being taken for granted in a time of rapid change, as opposed to being objectively unimportant to U.S. interests.

Issues

Table 1 indicates that the economy category dominated issues in 1993. The economy accounted for almost 40 percent of Clinton's beliefs concerning issues. It is the only category to be connected with every perceived international actor. The global institutions category's high rank in regards to economy reflects Clinton's penchant for pursuing economic growth through multilateral agreements and institutions during his first year in office. These include the GATT, Group of Seven (G-7), NAFTA, Generalized System of Preferences, and Harmonized Trade Schedule.

Economic issues occurred four times more often than any other individual category--another indication of its dominance within Clinton's belief system. The economy dwarfed even the combined areas of security/defense and arms control, which together accounted for about 15 percent of all international issues. In the cold war era, this situation was typically reversed: security/defense and arms control were considered to be "high" politics, dominating the issue landscape and occurring far more often than the economy. For instance, during the Carter presidency in 1977, while security/defense and arms control made up about 17 percent of the administration's issue statements, the economy ranked seventh out of eleven categories, accounting for just 7 percent of all issues. By 1980, when tensions with the Soviet Union increased, high politics accounted for more than 25 percent of the issues, and the economy dropped to number ten at a paltry 2.8 percent of issues perceived.(n73)

While arms control at 9.56 percent took up far less of Clinton's issue time in 1993 than the international economy, the president viewed it as a primary mechanism for enhancing American security: "We cannot let the expanding threat of these deadly nuclear weapons replace the Cold War nightmare of nuclear annihilation."(n74) Arms control's number two ranking provides evidence that the president acknowledged some traditional security concerns in 1993, even though the economy was his overriding concern.

Table 1 shows that a number of regional conflicts left over from the Bush administration continued to haunt President Clinton in 1993. In fact, the only two national addresses he made directly to the American public concerning international relations dealt with the Somali situation and the strike on the Iraqi intelligence headquarters. The plethora of small-scale conflicts registering on Clinton's issue agenda (ranked 3-7) indicate the type of war most likely to occur in the post-cold war international system.

However, despite the number of these regional conflicts in 1993, the president basically saw a cooperative world. For example, in Somalia, even after the death of a dozen American troops, Clinton felt that America should stay and help the United Nations relief effort, at least long enough to ensure that people would not experience mass starvation again; furthermore, he felt that the solution to the Somali problem was political, not military, and therefore sent Special Envoy Bob Oakley to help with the negotiations.(n75) Clinton saw the other conflicts during 1993 in much the same manner, preferring negotiation to force in Haiti, Bosnia, and the PLO-Israel dispute.

Only on rare occasions when President Clinton felt that U.S. interests were directly threatened did he view the world as more conflictual. Clinton's response to the planned assassination of former President Bush in Kuwait, engineered by Saddam Hussein, provides a prime example. The U.S. cruise missile attack on Iraq reinforced his verbal message: "We will combat terrorism. We will deter aggression. We will protect our people."(n76)

Clinton took the issue of human rights seriously and considered democracy to be at the core of basic human rights. Furthermore, Table I reveals that human rights was connected with six actors. However, its relatively lower priority represented the dominance of economics in his thinking and the more pressing problems of confronting the specific conflicts ranging around the globe. In a sense, Clinton saw human rights as intertwined with expanding markets and resolving various ethnic and political conflicts.

Security/defense (ranked 9 at 4.53 percent) took a lower priority than in the past, largely because the collapse of the USSR left Clinton viewing the world as less dangerous to American vital interests. Security/defense issues were scattered among six actors, with global security concerns and those in Asia/Pacific seen as most important. In 1993, Clinton actually spent a large amount of time talking about defense but in a domestic politics context concerning the issues of "gays in the military" and base closings.

The decline of the USSR also caused low scores for normalization (ranked next to last in Table I at 1.15 percent) since the number of potential countries with which to expand normal relations was dwindling. As for the environment (ranked tenth at 1.44 percent), the president showed some concern, but on an international level, most other challenges were more immediate and pressing. Finally, drug interdiction barely achieved mention in 1993, finishing last among the twelve categories in Clinton's beliefs concerning issues.

Clinton's Images 1994-95: Worldview in Transition

When President Clinton took office in 1993, his worldview centered on the expansion of commerce in an interdependent, rapidly changing world. Furthermore, he had a relatively simple view of the most important actors and issues: the economy and global institutions categories clearly dominated Clinton's image of the international system. Given the president's initial lack of foreign policy credentials, the potential for modification in worldview existed as he gained foreign policy experience through his term and as the environment changed over time. And, in fact, during the middle two years of the first term, the president developed a broader outlook concerning issues as security and arms control gained in importance relative to the economy. However, the occurrence of the global economic and security institution category actually increased over this time, appearing in nearly half of President Clinton's statements concerning foreign policy actors by 1995.

Actors

The global and economic security institutions category continued its dominance among actors in 1994 and 1995. Table 2 shows that the global category rose slightly to 36.41 percent in 1994, and Table 3 documents its rise to a whopping 45.36 percent in 1995. Latin America remained the second most important actor at 15.48 percent in 1994, according to Table 2, but with the resolution of the Haitian crisis, Table 3 indicates that Latin America dropped in importance in 1995 to just over 6 percent. Tables 2 and 3 show that Asia/Pacific dropped slightly in importance during both middle-term years, diminishing to 10 percent in 1994 and dropping further to 7.2 percent in 1995. Russia also declined modestly in salience over the period, going from 7.64 percent in 1994 to 7.27 percent in 1995.

Two areas, the Middle East and Eastern Europe, became more important in Clinton's worldview during 1994 and 1995. Tables 2 and 3 indicate that the Middle East rose to about 13 percent in both years and that Eastern Europe increased to 10.47 percent in 1994 and more than 13 percent in 1995. Western Europe and Africa continued to lag behind the other areas in terms of actor importance in the midterm years. Tables 2 and 3 show that Western Europe dropped to a very low 2.18 percent in 1994 and then rebounded to 5.68 percent in 1995, and Africa dropped steadily to 4 percent in 1994 and down to 2.15 percent in 1995.

Issues

In 1994 and 1995, Clinton's worldview began to reflect a wider variety of issues. As Table 2 shows, in 1994, the economy was still the number one issue. However, it made up only 25 percent of Clinton's beliefs concerning issues, compared to 40 percent in 1993. In addition, arms control and security/defense were seen as increasingly important, tied for the number two position at 17.85 percent each. Table 3 indicates that the gain in relative importance of security/defense and arms control compared to the economy largely remained in 1995. Beliefs concerning the economy increased slightly by about 3 percent between 1994 and 1995, while those concerning arms control decreased by about 3 percent, and security/defense remained largely unchanged at about 17 percent. Furthermore, while the economy was again connected with every actor during these two years, so were security and defense and, in 1995, arms control. Thus, in 1994 and 1995, the traditional high politics areas began to emerge and, taken together, actually exceeded the economy.

In 1994, three regional conflicts--Haiti, Bosnia, and the Middle East--continued to occupy a moderate amount of Clinton's rhetorical time, while conflict in two other areas, Somalia and "Other," were relatively minor. Table 2 shows that the Haitian conflict was now the number four issue at 11.61 percent; this represents an increase over 1993, as President Clinton prepared to use force as a last resort to resolve the issue. However, as shown in Table 3, in 1995 the Haitian conflict dropped to less than I percent after Haitian military rulers agreed to step down with U.S. military action apparently imminent.

Tables 2 and 3 show the Bosnian conflict increasing in importance for Clinton's belief system, going up slightly in 1994 to 8.67 percent, followed by a dramatic doubling in importance to 17.73 percent in the subsequent year, to make it the number two issue in 1995. The Middle East conflict remained fairly steady in 1994 and 1995: Table 2 shows a slight drop-off to 7.86 percent, and Table 3 shows a slight rebound back to 9 percent.

The Somalia conflict was a bare afterthought in Clinton's schema in 1994 and 1995, as U.S. troops were withdrawn after a disastrous first year in which casualties soured American public opinion about the humanitarian venture. Table 2 shows Somalia at a mere .73 percent in 1994, and Table 3 indicates that Somalia fell completely off the president's radar screen in 1995. Tables 2 and 3 also indicate that the other conflict category fell to less than 3 percent during Clinton's middle two years, with African conflicts still registering in 1994 and the Northern Ireland situation becoming more important in 1995.

The human rights category continued to be of modest importance in 1994 and 1995, hovering a little over 5 percent. However, as Tables 2 and 3 also show, human rights was connected to every actor category in these two years, with more emphasis on Latin America and Russia in 1994 and the Middle East and Eastern Europe in 1995. Finally, Tables 2 and 3 indicate that the environment, normalization, and drug interdiction remained relatively low priorities (all at about 2 percent or less) in President Clinton's worldview in 1994 and 1995.

Clinton's Images 1996: Pursuing Global Security and Commerce

By the final year of his first term, Bill Clinton displayed a more complex worldview compared to his inaugural outlook: in 1993, his image of the international system was unidimensional, dominated by the global economy; by 1996, his foreign policy beliefs concerning actors and issues were relatively multidimensional.(n77) He saw the world as a more hostile place and emphasized global security concerns more than global economics--although international economic concerns still seemed to be relatively more important than for previous cold war presidents. Issues such as the Middle East conflict and drug interdiction became more important. Stability in the president's belief system could still be seen in Clinton's optimistic view of change and in his continued preference for multilateral action through global security and economic institutions.

Actors

Although the global economic and security institutions category dropped by about 14 percentage points from 1995, Table 4 shows that it remained the number one actor at more than 31 percent in 1996--its fourth year at the number one position. According to Table 4, the Middle East was the second-ranked actor in 1996, occupying almost 26 percent of President Clinton's rhetorical time and tied directly to the increase in conflict and instability in that region during the year.

Asia/Pacific, at 11.8 percent, continued to be important in Clinton's thinking in 1996: Table 4 shows that the region was linked to security and defense, economic issues, and drug interdiction. Table 4 shows that Eastern Europe, at 8.57 percent, was tied largely to the Bosnian conflict, and Latin America, at 8.11 percent, was important for drug interdiction efforts. Finally, Table 4 shows that Western Europe, Russia, and Africa were rated low in 1996: all were at, below, or around 6 percent.

Issues

Table 4 shows that security and defense emerged as the number one issue at 23.17 percent and that the economy was now number two at 21.96 percent. Table 4 also shows that arms control continued to be important at 9.36 percent, and when this category was combined with security and defense, the economy was actually smaller by comparison. Although security and defense were traditionally the realm of high politics, their position here is not reflective of traditional cold war security issues: instead, terrorism was the main concern.

Table 4 indicates that the Middle East conflict was the third most important issue in 1996 at almost 18 percent (double its rating from 1995), reflecting increased tensions in the area and more U.S. involvement in brokering peace talks. On the other hand, the Bosnian conflict, while still important at 9.45 percent, actually declined by about half its 1995 rating, indicating a more stable political environment following the hectic and chaotic problems of 1995. As for other regional conflicts, Table 4 shows that Haiti was almost totally ignored by 1996, Somali escaped rhetorical mention completely, and the other conflicts category (3.34 percent) was still tied to mediating the Catholic/Protestant violence in Northern Ireland.

Of the remaining issues, drug interdiction was the biggest surprise since human rights, the environment, and normalization all remained near the bottom in relative importance. Table 4 shows that drug interdiction was now the fourth most important issue in President Clinton's worldview at 11.58 percent--about six times its relative importance in 1995, 1994, and 1993 put together. The drug interdiction category was connected to every actor with the exception of Western Europe. Latin America and Asia/ Pacific were associated most often. Domestic political factors may have been the cause of the drug interdiction issue's rise to prominence in Clinton's worldview. During the 1996 election campaign, President Clinton became vulnerable to Republican charges that he is "soft on drugs": statistics indicate that teenage drug use increased during his first term, and Republicans took great delight in running advertisements showing Clinton telling his MTV audience that if he had to do it all over again, he would have "inhaled" when he experimented with marijuana in college. In addition, survey evidence from 1995 shows that Americans thought "stopping the flow of illegal drugs into the U.S." was the most important foreign policy goal for the country to address, with 85 percent of respondents ranking it as a "very important" goal.(n78) Partially in response to the actual rise in drug use, as well as to Republican allegations and public concern, drug interdiction skyrocketed in the president's issue schema in 1996.

Stability and Change in Clinton's Belief System

Tables 5 and 6 provide a better picture of variation in the important issues and actors perceived by President Clinton over his entire first term. For instance, Table 5 makes it easier to see the dominance of economy as an issue over four years but also shows the relative drop after 1993. Furthermore, after a very slow start in 1993, security and defense became much more important over the final three years. Table 5 also portrays the ebb and flow of regional conflicts as important issues in President Clinton's belief system: some, such as Somalia and Haiti, were inherited from the previous administration but dropped from sight over time; others, such as Bosnia and the Middle East, waxed and waned in importance in response to changing conditions.

Table 6 shows the prominence of global institutions in Clinton's schema: this category averaged more than one-third of all rhetorical statements during the term. However, there was some variance in the global economic and security institutions category. After remaining stable at about 36 percent in 1993 and 1994, a large spike upward (reaching more than 45 percent) occurred in 1995 due primarily to increased U.S. activity in the escalating Bosnia crisis in conjunction with the United Nations and NATO. While still the most numerous actor category during 1996, references to global institutions dropped dramatically to 31 percent, the lowest point in the term. As with the issue category of drug interdiction, this relative change in importance may also be tied to domestic politics. During the election campaign, Republican presidential hopefuls Bob Dole,(n79) Phil Gramm,(n80) and Patrick Buchanan(n81) all hammered President Clinton's views toward the United Nations. While President Clinton defended the role of the United Nations,(n82) and a bare majority of the country generally agreed with him,(n83) Americans were less enthusiastic about the specific issue of putting American troops under United Nations command.(n84) Thus, some evidence suggests President Clinton may have downplayed the United Nations specifically and global and economic security institutions generally to a certain degree during his 1996 reelection bid to blunt the attacks of his political rivals.

The importance of certain regions may also vary by changes in conflictual behavior in the affected areas: Table 6 indicates that the importance of Africa, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East rose and fell to some degree based on the severity of the conflict raging in that area in a particular year. Finally, Table 6 shows the rather steady importance of emerging areas such as Asia and the declining relative importance of traditional enemy Russia and traditional ally Western Europe.

Tables 5 and 6 also reveal an interesting pattern in the overall number of times President Clinton spoke about foreign policy during each year. From 1993 to 1995, the president averaged about 1,400 statements a year concerning international relations, with avariance of less than 5 percent. However, in the election year of 1996, the number of actor/issue statements dropped significantly to less than 1,100. In addition, the overall number of presidential statements did not drop in 1996: the 1996 subject index to the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents is right at the four-ear term average of thirty-one pages. Thus, there is some suggestive evidence that Clinton still sees downplaying foreign policy issues and actors as smart election year politics in the post-cold war era.(n85)

Overall, President Clinton's beliefs concerning the international system during his first term in office reflect stability and change. Table 7 summarizes the main elements of the president's worldview in 1993 and in 1996. In 1993, Clinton's worldview was relatively unidimensional and unsophisticated, captured by the slightly altered campaign mantra, "It's the global economy, stupid." By 1996, the president's worldview showed increasing signs of complexity: while the economy was still considered important, it was supplanted by security and defense issues. In addition, the Middle East conflict attained major issue status by 1996, rising from more moderate positioning in 1993.

Arms control remained moderately important in both 1993 and 1996, as did some regional conflicts: the Haitian conflict occupied a fair degree of the president's rhetorical time in his first year, and the Bosnia conflict rose to prominence in his last year. While regional conflicts showed some general stability (although not the specific region), the issue of drug interdiction showed great change, rising from trace amounts in 1993 to moderate importance in 1996.

As Table 7 indicates, the most important actor in Clinton's worldview was remarkably stable: global economic and security institutions emerged as the most significant actor during all four years. In particular, the United Nations was the dominant single actor within the category. The Middle East emerged strongly in 1996 as well, as Table 7 displays, but also achieved moderate actor salience in 1993. Likewise, Table 7 shows that several other areas achieved moderate actor salience at both the beginning and end of the term: Asia/Pacific, Latin America, and Eastern Europe. Only Russia showed a substantial decline in actor importance over the first term.

President Clinton's preferred future image in 1993 was the expansion of global markets; by 1996, this had broadened to include the pursuit of global security as well. Also, as Table 7 shows, the president's view of change remained relatively unchanged over his first term: Bill Clinton ran for office stressing a positive view of change (and himself an agent for that change) in 1993; despite the evolution in his foreign policy worldview--specifically, his recognition of the continued importance of security issues--he remained quite optimistic about change in 1996.

Several forces help explain stability and change in President Clinton's worldview, including his own basic personality characteristics, the international system structure, domestic political circumstances, and the behavior of other global actors. Personality characteristics operate within the broad parameters established by the environment but almost certainly account for some of the stability or variance in worldview. For instance, President Clinton's predilection to lead by consensus helps explain his heavy reliance on global economic and security regimes. His innate optimism directed him to be positive about future changes and events. His orientation to detail enabled him to grasp the nuances and complexities of new situations but may have blinded him to the broader view of world affairs that is sometimes necessary for effective long-term foreign policy making. His desire to please others and avoid conflict may have served as an asset in brokering peace accords but proved to be a liability in situations in which an unequivocal stance was needed.(n86)

At the opposite end of the spectrum lies the influence of the international system. The collapse of the Soviet Union altered the system structure in such a way as to allow economic issues to emerge in importance after a forty-year legacy of cold war-driven security issues: without this change, it was unlikely that the economy category would have dominated Clinton's views about foreign policy to the extent that it did. However, while creating a zone of peace within the United States and most of the first-tier nations, the end of the cold war also allowed old ethnic rivalries to break out in formerly subjugated countries, creating a zone of turmoil among many second-tier nations.(n87) This increase in regional conflict, in turn, affected the worldview and actions of the president, directing his focus toward different areas of the globe and making the world seem more or less conflictual as violence broke out and then subsided. In addition, the collapse of the Soviet Union allowed the Asia/Pacific region to assume a position of higher relative importance as a global actor in Clinton's worldview, since China became the biggest potential security threat and economic opportunity and Japan was seen as a counterbalance to China.

Changing domestic political circumstances, such as the rise of illegal drug usage as Republican campaign fodder in conjunction with public concern about keeping drugs out of the country, almost certainly boosted the issue of drug interdiction in Clinton's 1996 worldview. Likewise, the GOP attacks on the use of United Nations commanders for U.S. troops probably depressed global economic and security institutions in the last year of Clinton's first term. Going back to 1992, widespread public sentiment concerning the importance of the economy coming off a recession almost certainly heightened the importance of the international economy in Clinton's belief system during his first year in office. Alternatively, one year later, public disgust over the Somalia fiasco surely helped to reduce the importance of this second-tier conflict.

Finally, of course, how other international players act and react to their environment alters worldview: the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Rabin in 1995 evoked higher priority for brokering Middle East peace, raising the status of the region as both an issue and an actor; the bombing of the World Trade Center brought a new security issue--terrorism--to the forefront; continued defiance by Bosnian Serbs eventually resulted in a more forceful response from the United Nations peacekeeping forces, with U.S. support, and the upgrading of the Bosnian crisis as an issue; and belligerence by North Korea on developing weapons of mass destruction led to a surge in arms control.

Conclusion

In sum, when it comes to foreign policy, President Clinton does seem to have a worldview, and that worldview evolved over his first term in office. In 1993, President Clinton had a unidimensional, simplistic image of the international system, summed up by the slightly altered campaign refrain, "It's the global economy, stupid." By 1996, Clinton's worldview became more complex, reflecting a multidimensional outlook on issues and actors. This evolution in beliefs is attributable to changes in the international environment, domestic political situation, and behavior of world leaders, which interacted with the president's personality characteristics and are reflected in his words and deeds.

Clinton's preference for and reliance on multilateral actions through global security and economic institutions is likely to continue, as is his optimism about global change and his preferred future of enlargement, although with more emphasis on economics and security than on democracy and human rights. Domestic public opinion will also likely influence the way Clinton looks at the world, although an effect as radical as the dramatic surge in issue importance of drug interdiction in 1996 is less likely since he cannot run for reelection in 2000.

The global economy will continue to be a central feature of Clinton's image of the international system. However, recognition that security issues are still relatively important (although coming in different forms, such as regional conflicts, terrorism, nuclear, biological and chemical arms proliferation, and illegal drug importation) represents a more accurate reflection of the dangers that exist in the post-cold war world and indicates a maturation of Clinton's worldview.(n88) Theory and empirical evidence suggest that this should aid his administration in crafting more cohesive, more consistent, and higher quality foreign policy during his second term as president.

Gratitude is extended to Dale Smith, Heidi Hobbs, Michael Brecher, Paul Brace, Kevin Wang, and Don Smith for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. Thanks also to anonymous reviewer #2 and Brian Krapf at Presidential Studies Quarterly, who encouraged us to update our original work. An earlier version of this article on foreign policy beliefs and behavior in the first year of the Clinton presidency was presented at the International Studies Association annual meeting in 1995, in which it was a finalist for the Alexander George Award.